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EQUAL PROTECTION-AN END TO WEALTH
DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
"[T]here is no justification-constitutional or otherwise-for permit-
ting the circumstances of parental wealth and geography to determine the
quality of a child's education in the public schools of a state."'
Action was brought by public school pupils challenging the California
public school financing scheme. Petitioners contended that they were
denied equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution due to the allocation of ed-
ucational resources in direct proportion to the wealth of the residents of
individual school districts. This method of allocation resulted in dis-
parities in the amount of funds available for education in wealthy dis-
tricts and poor districts causing residents of poorer districts to pay a higher
tax rate on their property for the education of their children, than do the
parents of children in the wealthier districts. As a result, a child in a
poorer district is likely to receive an education inferior to that received
by a child residing in a more wealthy district.
The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Robert W. Kenny, J.,
granted defendants' motion for dismissal because after the defendants'
demurrer was sustained, the plaintiffs failed to amend their complaints.
The court of appeals held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment with directions
to the lower court to overrule the demurrers. It held that the public
school financing system in California does cause substantial disparities
in the amount of revenue available per student among school districts.
The resulting inequality of educational facilities available to its students
constitutes discrimination by wealth in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. John Serrano, Jr., et al, Plaintiffs
and Appellants, v. Ivy Baker Priest, as State Treasurer, etc., et al,
Defendants and Respondents Sup. Calif. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Examined here is the evolution of the equal protection formula for
determining the constitutionality of classifications of persons via a statute
1. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS, THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY at xi (1968).
2. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
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affecting some fundamental interest for which no over-riding state in-
terest justifies such classifications. The application of such a formula
and the recognition of education as a fundamental interest complete the
scope of this note.
The complaint in Serrano v. Priest3 essentially took the form of three
causes of action. The first cause of action alleges that the plaintiffs
are students attending schools in Los Angeles County under a financing
scheme that relies heavily on taxation of real property within each
school district for its revenue; that this method of financing causes sub-
stantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount of
revenue available per pupil in the district; and that as a result of this
method of financing, districts with smaller tax bases (based upon as-
sessed valuation of real property, including industrial property contained
within the district) cannot spend as much money per child for education
as districts with larger tax bases. This financing scheme violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution by creating substantial dis-
parities in the quality of educational opportunities available to school
children in the various school districts of the state. As a result, plaintiff
school children claim they are afforded substantially inferior educational
opportunities than are made available to school children in many other
districts of the state. Also enumerated in the complaint are specific
allegations of denials of equal protection.4  In their second cause of ac-
3. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
4. The complaint alleges that the financing scheme:
"A. Makes the quality of education for school age children in California, including
Plaintiff Children, a function of the wealth of the children's parents and neigh-
bors, as measured by the tax base of the school district in which said children
reside, and
"B. Makes the quality of education for school age children in California, including
Plaintiff Children, a function of the geographical accident of the school district in
which said children reside, and
"C. Fails to take account of any of the variety of educational needs of the sev-
eral school districts (and of the children therein) of the State of California, and
"D. Provides students living in some school districts of the State with material
advantages over students in other school districts in selecting and pursuing their
educational goals, and
"E. Fails to provide children of substantially equal age, aptitude, motivation, and
ability with substantially equal educational resources, and
"F. Perpetuates marked differences in the quality of educational services, equip-
ment and other facilities which exist among the public school districts of the State
as a result of the inequitable apportionment of State resources in past years.
"G. The use of the 'school district' as a unit for the differential allocation of
educational funds bears no reasonable relation to the California legislative purpose
of providing equal educational opportunity for all school children within the State.
"H. The part of the State financing scheme which permits each school district to
retain and expend within that district all of the property tax collected within that
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tion plaintiffs alleged that they, as parents, are required to pay a higher
tax rate than taxpayers in many other school districts in order to ob-
tain for their children the same or lesser educational opportunities af-
forded children in other districts. Thirdly, they alleged that an actual
controversy exists between the parties as to the validity and constitu-
tionality of the financing scheme. The complaint prayed for a declara-
tion that the present financing system is unconstitutional.
Defendants' contention was that through a system of basic aid and
equalization aid the government distributes funds in a manner bene-
ficial to the poorer districts; that this system tends to equalize disparities
caused by the differing tax bases of the various school districts; and that
in spite of any inequality which may result, such a plan is necessary
to promote the compelling state interest of allowing local control of
schools by district and allowing each community to decide for itself how
much it will spend for the education of its children.
The court, in finding for the plaintiff, took this opportunity to seize
upon the constitutional issues of the case and examine the application
of equal protection to wealth discrimination as applied to school finance.
The importance of the Serrano decision becomes clear in light of the
fact that most states finance their schools in much the same way that
California's statute provides. 5 Speaking directly to the defense's argu-
ments, the court stated, "assuming arguendo that local administrative con-
trol may be a compelling state interest, the present financial system
cannot be considered necessary to further this interest," 6 and
such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts. We cannot
agree that Baldwin Park residents care less about education than those in Beverly
Hills solely because Baldwin Park spends less than $600 per child while Beverly
Hills spends over $1200. As defendants themselves recognize, perhaps the most
accurate reflection of a community's commitment to education is the rate at
which its citizens are willing to tax themselves to support their schools. Yet by
that standard, Baldwin Park should be deemed far more devoted to learning than
Beverly Hills, for Baldwin Park citizens levied a school tax of well over $5 per
$100 of assessed valuation, while residents of Beverly Hills paid only slightly
more than $2.7
The court applied the traditional formula for the examination of state
district bears no reasonable relation to any educational objective or need.
"I. A disproportionate number of school children who are black children, children
with Spanish surnames, children belonging to other minority groups reside in school
districts in which a relatively inferior educational opportunity is provided." Id.
at 589-90, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05, 487 P.2d at 1244-45.
5. WIsE, supra note 1, at 3, fn. 3.
6. Serrano v. Priest, supra note 3, at 610, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620, 487 P.2d at 1261.
7. Id. at 611, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620, 487 P.2d at 1261.
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laws when equal protection is in issue. Where the classifying fact is in-
herently suspect by race or wealth, or the interest is characterized as
fundamental, the standard of review is whether the distinctions drawn
are necessary to further a compelling state interest. 8
Perhaps the most ambiguous factor in this equal protection formula
is the determination of what is a fundamental interest. Serrano broke
new ground in holding that education is the most recent addition to a
growing list of fundamental interests which will allow courts to apply con-
stitutional sanctions. 9
To determine the inherent inequity (if not the scope) 1° of such a
financing scheme, this note will examine some statistical material con-
cerning educational expenditure. The existence of wealth discrimination
and its potential to do harm through its effect upon educational oppor-
tunity should become clear in light of the figures given below. Under
a system in which the quality of schools reflects assessed valuation of
the real property in the district, the quality of public education depends
upon the wealth of a child's parents. To exemplify the substantial
variation in tax bases throughout the state of California the court noted
that "the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance of
elementary school children ranged from a low of $103 to a peak of
$952,156-a ratio of nearly 1 to 10,000.'Il This figure alone shows
the basic inequity to children of a state which bases financing on prop-
erty values. Also to be considered is the injustice of such a system
with respect to parents who must adjust the rate of taxation of their
own property (especially in districts with a low industrial tax base) to
maintain a competitive school system for their children. Between dis-
tricts with small or even moderate disparity in their tax bases, the resi-
dents retain some control over the relative quality of education for their
children by their ability to tax themselves accordingly-to work a little
harder for the sake of good schools. But what choice do the residents
8. For example, see Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 630
(1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
9. On the factual issue the court held, "Although equalization aid and supple-
mental aid temper the disparities which result from the vast variations in real prop-
erty assessed valuation, wide differentials remain in the revenue available to in-
dividual districts and, consequently, in the level of educational expenditures."
Serrano, supra note 3, at 594, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1247.
10. According to Mr. Wise, supra note 1, nearly all of the states provide for
financing of their local school districts essentially through local taxation of real
property within the school district. California's and Illinois' statistics are presum-
ably representative of the situation in most states.
11. Serrano v. Priest, supra note 3, at 592, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606, 487 P.2d at
1246.
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of a poor school district have when faced with such large variances as
between Baldwin Park where the assessed valuation per child is $3,706 and
Beverly Hills where the figure runs to over $50,000?12 No matter how
hard the people of the poor districts tax themselves, there is no hope
that their children will enjoy a school nearly as well equipped as one
in a wealthier district.
Mr. Wise points out evidence of similar disparity. In high school dis-
tricts in Illinois, having an average daily attendance of less than four
hundred pupils, there were variances in assessed valuation of real prop-
erty ranging from a high of $322,179 to a low of $14,414, a ratio of
over 22 to 1; and, in elementary districts, there were found to be vari-
ances in a ratio of over 50 to 1.13
One writer comments on the potential danger inherent in this system
in the possibility of gerrymandering:
The local share of the education bill is paid primarily from taxation of the
real property located in the district. Hence, the power of some districts to include
estates of large industrial holdings within their boundaries but to exclude high-
density residential areas allows those districts to provide expensive educational
programs at extremely low tax rates. The other result, of course, is that the
poorer districts (in terms of local real property tax base) must levy taxes at high
rates in order to finance even a minimum program. The gerrymandering of
the real property base excludes a substantial portion of local wealth from the
support of schools. 14
Such a temptation could well prove overpowering to those influential
residents of suburban school districts which border high density urban
areas.
Mr. Wise reported two gerrymandered districts he labeled X and Y.
District X had 411 pupils with an assessed property valuation per pupil
of $226,505 and an expenditure per pupil of $1,168 while district Y
which contained 4,279 pupils, had an assessed valuation per pupil of
$16,985 and was able to spend only $479.52 per pupil.15
12. See CAL. DEPT. ED. CAL. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SELECTED STATISTICS, 1968-1969
(1970) Table IV-II at 90-91.
13. Wise, supra note 1, at 128; see generally COVANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS 2-3
(1961); COONS, CLUNE, and SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
434-36 (Bantam Ed. 1968); Horowitz and Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of
Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place
Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 787 (1968); Horowitz, Unseparate but
Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education,
13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1147 (1966).
14. BENSON, THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF PUB-
LIC EDUCATION at 44-45 (1965).
15. Wise, supra note 1, at 128.
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Statistics such as these go to prove that under such a system only a
district with a large tax base will be able to decide how much it would
like to spend to educate its children. The poorer districts are limited
in their decision by how far they are able to tax themselves. The
question may arise as to whether this is inherently bad or merely a nec-
essary evil. True, under the free enterprise economic system, some
people are going to have to work harder (or spend a greater portion of
their income) for a given commodity than others. Arguments have
been made in other contexts attempting to justify such inequality. But,
here we are dealing not with ordinary goods and services but with a
fundamental interest---education. The following is a discussion of the
history of equal protection and the evolution of the doctrine of strict
scrutiny of discriminatory classifications.
The fourteenth amendment with its equal protection and due process
clauses has long been the authority by which the courts have been able
to examine the actions of state legislatures. This authority was recog-
nized by Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.16
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.
It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legisla-
tion, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection
of the laws.1 7
The old equal protection refers to that relatively narrow application of
the clause during a time of reluctance by the courts to step into the
legislative domain. There was a presumption that state laws which
classified persons did so out of necessity and in good faith. The ra-
tional relationship rule was used whereby the state, when defending a
classifying statute, needed to prove only some rational relationship be-
tween the interest of the state and the purpose of the statute to be held
within the limits of the fourteenth amendment. There has always been
a heavy burden of proving lack of reasonable relationship between state
interest and statutory purpose on the part of a class which seeks relief
from any burdens which may be imposed on it by such a statute.' 8
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. Id. at 11; see also Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Robinson v. Florida,
378 U.S. 153 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
18. See Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945); Snowden v.
Hughs, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S.
573 (1938); State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931);
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Discriminating statutes were therefore presumed justified and, except for
statutes which classify people for the sole purpose of discrimination
against one class, were held constitutional.
As exemplified in the Civil Rights Cases and others, the equal pro-
tection clause was applied in the early cases to statutes involving racial
discrimination. The racial cases were, by their facts, easily applicable
to the sanctions of the fourteenth amendment. Also, the reconstruction
origins of the amendment created the impression in some courts that the
equal protection clause was limited in its application to the race cases.Y9
The obvious application of the clause became its limitation. Even re-
strictions of such basic interests as the right to bear children were not
considered sufficient to apply the sanctions of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Buck v. Bell.20 Classifications of persons for any plausible end
were considered to be justified. It was only in cases involving clear
violations of equal protection via discriminatory state laws that the Court
would use the constitutional sanctions of the equal protection clause.
21
Indeed, the Court held the fourteenth amendment was meant to refer
exclusively to issues involving racial discrimination.
Concern with non-racial classifications of persons grew but did not
merit the sympathy of the courts until much later. Cases questioning
such classifications continued to be met with the old equal protection
rule of rationality of relationship to state objectives. The missing ele-
ment in these cases was the special need for a strict scrutiny by the courts
as provided by the inherently suspect classification of race. This ac-
ceptance of non-racial classification was voiced by the Court in follow-
ing the narrow rule preventing judicial intervention in state statutes in
the more recent case, Salsburg v. Maryland.22  Here the classification
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores of Ohio Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
19. See State v. Weber, 96 Minn. 422, 105 N.W. 490 (1905), (limiting right of
suffrage of naturalized citizens); Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 A. 543 (1903),
(voting restrictions denying registration of citizens with a residency of less than one
year in state upheld); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), (holding the
amendment confers no new rights on citizens generally); McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo.
719, 30 P. 293 (1892), (holding exclusion of women from jury is not prohibited by
the amendment); Allen v. Wyckoff, 48 N.J.L. 90, 2 A. 659 (1886), (holding dis-
crimination against nonresidents in game laws does not violate the amendment).
20. 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see also Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270
(1940), (sterilization); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), (involuntary com-
mitment to mental institution); but see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. See for example, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
22. 346 U.S. 545 (1954); see also McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 18 and
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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was one based upon counties with respect to the admissability of evi-
dence, concerning certain gambling misdemeanors, inadmissible in other
counties, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The Court held that
such classifications were presumed to be reasonable and were not subject
to strict examination for violation of equal protection. The constitu-
tional safeguard was held to apply only in cases involving classifications
that were wholly irrelevant to the state's objectives. 23 So at this point,
we have the recognized authority of the Court to strike down state laws
which are violative of equal protection. We also have seen the recogni-
tion that classifications of people by statutes (though presumed to be
reasonable and not subject to any special suspicion) calls to the attention
of the court that these people, so classified, have some tendency to fear
for their own constitutional safety, if only by reason of the fact of the
classification itself. Still needed, however, is an inherently suspect clas-
sification beyond that of race, which will call for strict scrutiny of the
courts even where the interest involved is not of a fundamental nature.
The new equal protection refers to those decisions which have ex-
panded the application of equal protection by recognizing the existence
of certain suspect classifications which, when recognized by the court,
require a strict scrutiny of the statute creating the classification. The
purpose of such an examination is to determine whether that statute
is necessary to further some compelling state interest-a much higher
standard of scrutiny than the old rule of mere rational relationship and
presumed reasonableness.2 4 Whether a classification should be charac-
terized as suspect has been the subject of both old and new equal pro-
tection arguments. The earlier cases held, in effect, that race classifica-
tions were inherently suspect; but, for any other classification to be
treated with suspicion, the presumption of reasonableness had to be
overcome. 2  This was a formidable problem to the courts who had
23. Reasonable classifications have been defined as those which are incidental
to necessary legislation. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Kotch v. River
Port Pilots Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286
U.S. 352 (1932).
24. See Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra note 8, at 627-28 "and
the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a
'rational basis' for the distinctions made are not applicable. [See Harper v. Va. Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).] The presumption of constitutionality and
the approval given 'rational' classifications in other types of enactments are based
on an assumption that the institutions of state government are structured so as to
represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in
effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as
the basis for presuming constitutionality."
25. Id.
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traditionally been reluctant to interfere with state law. The new equal
protection cases recognize classification as suspect if some fundamental
interest has been affected by such a statute.
The foundation cases of Serrano v. Priest apply the strict scrutiny
of the new equal protection to statutes creating classifications along lines
of wealth. 26  The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
law has been especially vulnerable where statutes create classifications
which result in harsh treatment of the poor. Poverty is a condition
frought with denials of fundamental rights and has become an inherently
suspicious topic. Wealth classification has become sufficient to cause
independently a strict scrutiny by the courts. Indeed, whether an
interest is fundamental appears to hinge on whether the court finds the
existence of a classification along lines of wealth.
In 1956, the era of new equal protection began with the decision of
Griffin v. Illinois.2 7  The Court held that the Illinois criminal appellate
procedure was violative of the equal protection clause because indigent
defendants were required to provide their own transcript of the court
proceedings for appeal; except where an indigent defendant was sen-
tenced to death, in which case he would be afforded a free transcript.
Petitioners, having been convicted of armed robbery, moved that a certi-
fied copy of the entire record be provided them without cost, on the
ground of their indigency. The motion was denied and the Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded the case. Mr.
Justice Black, citing both the due process and equal protection clauses,
wrote in his opinion:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in ad-
vance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could
not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
28
Here the class was one of indigent defendants as opposed to defendants
with funds to buy a transcript, clearly a classification along lines of
wealth. The fundamental interest is that of a fair trial. "There can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."'29  More significantly, the Court implied the
existence of, at least in this area of criminal appeals, "an affirmative
duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circum-
26. See note 24; infra, notes 28, 33, 38.
27. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
28. Id. at 17-18.
29. Id. at 19.
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stances." °30  This case contains the first reference in the law of an af-
firmative duty imposed on the state to relieve the burdens of poverty.
The effect of Griffin was to define wealth as a suspect classification.
The next step in this new area of equal protection for the poor was
taken in 1963 in the case of Douglas v. California.3 Here the Court
took the step of applying the law developed in Griffin and reinforced
the commitment to equal protection for the poor. The defendants were
convicted of thirteen felonies including robbery and assault. Both indi-
gent defendants appealed as of right to the California District Court of
Appeal which affirmed the convictions. Defendants' petition for review
to the Supreme Court of California was denied. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to litigate the question in the petition as
to the right of counsel on appeal. The Court, relying primarily on
Griffin, agreed with the dissenting justice of the California Supreme
Court, who compared the effects of a denial of counsel with that of a
denial of a transcript to an indigent when the same reason, lack of funds,
causes both. 32
Mr. Justice Douglas spoke directly to the issue of wealth discrimina-
tion in his opinion.
There is lacking that equality demanded by the fourteenth Amendment where the
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while
the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is with-
out merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear
or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the
rich man has a meaningful appeal. 33
Mr. Justice Clark in his dissent recognizes the trend of the Court toward
a duty to indigent defendants and displays his disgust when he referred
to "this new fetish for indigency" 34 arguing that this trend in the area of
the criminal process creates too heavy a burden on the State's judicial
machinery. Justice Harlan again dissented saying this case, like Grif-
30. Id. at 34, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent arguing that this decision causes
discrimination by imposing a duty to aid some and not others. His thesis seems to
be that non-action cannot be discriminatory, while affirmatively aiding some, dis-
criminates against others. He does concede however, that there may be a due
process issue in the case.
31. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
32. Id. at 355, The "[dlenial of counsel on appeal (to an indigent) would seem
to be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illinois."
33. id. at 357-58.
34. Id. at 359, a dissent grounded in the practicality of operating within the
criminal process as compared with Justice Harlan's consistent objection on grounds
of construction.
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fin, speaks of due process, not equal protection. He recognized the il-
legality of a law which discriminates between rich and poor, but rigor-
ously dissented from the suggestion of illegality of any law that may
"affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich . . . ." Again, in
Douglas, appear the elements of the equal protection formula. Douglas
dealt with indigent defendants as a class and involved the fundamental
interest of representation by counsel on appeal. As the application of
the new equal protection grows out of the area of criminal indigency and
into other areas, the Court will be required to define more specific rights
as fundamental interests.
In 1966, the new equal protection emerged from the area of criminal
process. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 6 dealt with de facto dis-
crimination through wealth, in the form of a statute providing for a state
poll tax. Here the Court in its decision striking down the poll tax
broke new ground by invalidating a statute as violative of due process
even without a classification dividing rich and poor. Section 1973 of
Virginia's Constitution directed the General Assembly to levy an annual
poll tax not exceeding $1.50 on every resident of the state twenty-one
years of age or over. Section 18 provided for payment of the tax as a
precondition to voting, and Section 20 provided that all state poll tax
shall be paid for three years preceding the year in which one applies for
registration. The Court held that the poll tax was a fee chargable to
everyone who would vote, rich and poor alike, and therefore did not
create a classification along wealth lines. The decision of the Court
centered on the limited power of the state in the regulation of voting.37
The opinion goes on to speak of wealth discrimination as outside the
scope of the state's authority in fixing voting qualifications. "Voter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this
or any other tax."' 38 The opinion does, however, contain important
language about poverty and wealth discrimination as perhaps an inde-
pendent ground for the unconstitutionality of this law. Such language
contains the real significance of Harper. "Lines drawn on the basis of
35. Id. at 361. It is to be noted that in both Griffin and Douglas Mr. Justice
Harlan spoke separately to the issues of equal protection and due process.
36. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. Id. at 668. The Court held that the state was limited in its power to the
fixing of voter qualifications and that the ability to pay the poll tax had no relation
to a person's qualifications to vote.
38. Id. at 666. The Court did mention that some restrictions, such as literacy
tests, could be valid. But see Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965),
where the test was designed specifically to keep black people from voting.
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wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored. 39
The Court recognized the discrimination but said that the degree of dis-
crimination is irrelevant.40 However, the degree of discrimination may
have been very relevant, if the more positive means of relief via consti-
tutional authority of state regulation of voting had not been available.
Voting here was called a fundamental interest, even though voter qual-
ification are normally left up to the states. In the absence of a true
classification by wealth, this measure served to grant relief from a statute
which effectively denied the right of voting to those people inclined to
save the tax money rather than vote. The final effect of Harper is to
signal a step forward by the Court in holding that even without a clas-
sification per se, de facto discriminations are suspect and will be ex-
amined carefully in cases involving fundamental interests-in this case,
voting.
The significance of McDonald v. Board of Elections41 is in its exemplifi-
cation of the completed equal protection-wealth classification formula.
Petitioners, county jail inmates awaiting trial (most were without funds
to make bail), sought to receive absentee ballots for voting. They
claimed a strict scrutiny by the court was justified here because voting
rights were involved. In dealing with the right to receive absentee bal-
lots, the Court was compelled to consider the degree of scrutiny to be
applied to the case. Recognizing wealth as an independent ground for
the application of strict scrutiny, the facts of the case were considered
in the special light of dealing with poor people, stating:
And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race ... two factors which would render a
classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. 42
Here was one more voting case in which the Court was very careful to
consider the possible issue of wealth discrimination. Not all voting
cases require strict scrutiny, only those involving wealth or race classifica-
tions. Here, the Court found that no such classification existed and the
old rationality test was sufficient to settle the equal protection issue of
the case.
39. Id. at 668 referring to Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941),
as well as Griffin and Douglas. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
40. Id.
41. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
42. Id. at 807; see generally, Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAIRv. L. Rav. 7 (1969). An interesting
idea is put forth by Professor Michleman as to the significance of the court's mention
of Harper, a non-classification case, in the dictum. This is taken as a sign that the
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The effect of McDonald is to underscore the importance of wealth
and race as highly suspect classifications. In his opinion, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren said in effect that without the existence of the wealth is-
sue in Harper, it too would have been decided without the strict scrutiny
test as was McDonald. Classification by wealth alone has become a
criterion for strict scrutiny by courts.
It would appear that the completed formula was now ripe for ap-
plication to the school tax issue and its special fundamental interest,
education. The Serrano case, however, faced one obstacle which may
signal a limit in the federal jurisdiction of the application of the new
equal protection in the area of school finance. That obstacle was an
Illinois Supreme Court case.
The facts of Mclnnis v. Shapiro43 are essentially the same as those of
Serrano. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois school
financing system as a violation of equal protection because of the wide
variations among districts in school expenditures per pupil. These facts
were held by a three-judge Federal District Court not to constitute a
situation calling for strict scrutiny of the Illinois statute and held that,
under the old standard of rationality rather than a justifiable compelling
state interest, the statute allowed localities to "determine their own tax
burden according to the importance which they place upon public
schools." '44  Why didn't the facts here fit into the formula of strict
scrutiny? It is to be noticed that plaintiffs in McInnis significantly nar-
rowed the field of alternatives to the present system in arguing that only
a financing system which apportions public funds according to educa-
tional needs complies with the fourteenth amendment. This approach
held, in effect, that only the proposed system is constitutional. It now
appears that the better argument, at least from the standpoint of offer-
ing the court a less rigid alternative, would be to declare that only the
existing system is unconstitutional. It may well have been this rigid
approach that caused the court to fall back on the old equal protection
standard of rationality of classification. The court concluded that the
complaint states no cause of action because, "the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require that public school expenditures be made only on the
basis of pupils' educational needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable
court is now willing to consider the payment of a fee as a classification along
wealth lines.
43. 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968) affd. mem. sub. nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969).
44. Id. at 333. This argument is answered at length by the court in Serrano,
supra note 3, 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620, 487 P.2d at 1260 (1971).
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standard makes this controversy nonjusticiable. ' '45  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam. 46  No cases were cited and there
was no oral argument. Such an affirmance is formally a decision on the
merits, however, so the actual significance of this case is not clear.47
Whether the Federal District Court would have been more receptive to an
argument stressing wealth discrimination is unknown. However, it
appears that such an argument would have offered the judges a less
burdensome decision both in terms of not requiring them to legislate by
holding that only one type of system is constitutional and in being able to
fit the argument and facts into the guidelines of wealth discrimination as
developed by the Supreme Court.48
When the school children of Los Angeles County brought suit to
have the California school financing scheme declared unconstitutional,
they were confronted with the past decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court with its guidelines and the obstacle of the adverse decision
in Mclnnis. The Serrano case will probably gain prominence as the
first case which added education to the list of fundamental interests pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment, and which strictly scrutinized the
law creating classifications of children by school districts. The thrust of
plaintiffs' argument was based squarely on a discriminatory classification
which was based on wealth. Plaintiffs claimed to represent all public
school pupils in California except children in that school district which
affords the greatest educational opportunity of all school districts within
California.49  And plaintiff parents purported to represent the class of
parents who have children in the school system and who pay real property
taxes in the county of their residence. 5
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id.
47. STERN AND GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, (4th Ed. 1969) at 233.
It has been observed that the dismissal of an appeal, technically an adjudication on
the merits, is in practice often the substantial equivalent of a denial of certiorari.
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945), "But we have often said, a denial of cer-
tiorari by this court imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case."
For an extended discussion of the rationale of this principle, see Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 488-497 (1953). (Frankfurter, J., concurring but speaking for the
majority on this point). See also Frankfurter and Landis, The Business o1 the
Supreme Court at October Term 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1930).
48. The Petitioner's argument in Mclnnis has been compared to "free floating
logis pulled together from scattered wisps of Supreme Court dicta showing little or-
ganic connection to the facts." Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Oppor-
tunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. at 352.




The court agreed that the alleged classification did indeed classify
along lines of wealth, citing Harper and McDonald, and that education
was a fundamental interest (acknowledging lack of direct authority for
this holding). 51  The court found that the statute was not necessary to
accomplish any compelling state interest and52 did deny plaintiff school
children and their parents equal protection of the laws 'because it pro-
duces substantial disparities among school districts, in. the amount of
revenue available for education."5  This is a decision which, except for
the new finding that education is a fundamental interest, appears to be
completely in line with the Supreme Court's past decisions on wealth
discrimination and equal protection.
Must the rule of law, that relative wealth may not determine the
quality of public education, be applied to rall tax-supported public ser-
vices? Definitely not. The court seemed to sense this possible danger
and was careful to define, in each case involving the new equal protec-
tion, the specific fundamental interest involved. Serrano stressed the im-
portance of education in its opinion. The Supreme Court imposed limits
on the idea in McDonald54 by holding that even though voting is a
fundamental right, the right :to receive an absentee ballot is not. Post
Griffin and Douglas cases do show a limited expansion in the fundamen-
tal interest in a free transcript and counsel on appeal' for indigents. Fil-
ing fees,55 right on collateral proceedings,5 6 transcripts for habeas corpus
51. The Court cited as authority for finding that education was a fundamental
interest the memorable quote in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954). "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-just normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."; see also Hargrave v.
McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. The interest set forth by defendant was the strengthening and encourage-
ment of local responsibility for control of public education.
53. Serrano v. Priest, supra note 3, 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625, 487
P.2d at 1265 (1971).
54. McDonald, supra note 41.
55. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); see also Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S.
192 (1960).
56. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
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proceedings, 57 and the determination of the necessity of free transcript"8
have all been found to be within the scope of Griffin. These cases are
notable in their obvious similarity to Griffin. More notable are some
new cases which seem to restrict the application of equal protection.59
So, in light of a possible trend to limit an easy application of equal
protection, the possibility of Serrano's rule being applied to all the states
via a United States Supreme Court affirmation of its rule is highly uncer-
tain. The rule will ultimately be decided by the new Court with its yet
untested members. The real issue must be whether the legal flexibility
necessary to cause a radicial alteration of the school finance systems of
all the states can be achieved within the limits of "strict constructionism."
If the United States Supreme Court does not see fit to so rule in the
near future, the individual states will be put under great pressure toward
change.
Gary Johnson
57. Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
58. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
59. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971).
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